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Abstract (125 words) 
In recent years market-based interventions have been positioned as the basis for addressing 
what the editors of this special issue have termed ‘collective concerns’ in fields as diverse as 
healthcare, the environment and crime. This paper considers the terms of such interventions 
and the market-like relations these terms pre-suppose. It does so through a comparison of two 
interventions: a market-based scheme to address concerns regarding electronic waste and a 
Social Impact Bond for children at-risk of going into care. Ideas from Science and 
Technology Studies are drawn on to explore the composition of market-based interventions, 
the terms established through accountability devices which decide on who and what gets to 
participate and the consequences that follow. 
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Introduction 
In recent years market-based interventions have been positioned as the basis for addressing 
what the editors of this special issue have termed ‘collective concerns’ in fields as diverse as 
healthcare, the environment and crime. Such interventions have included privatisation, 
outsourcing and funding arrangements which emphasise notions of competition.1 In these 
interventions the market is presented as a basis for efficiently and effectively selling or 
allocating scarce, mostly public, resources.2 This has inspired a range of critiques from 
scholars of neoliberalism regarding such matters as the marketization of the state (see for 
example, Peck, 2010; Brown, 2015). However, Mirowski (2013) sounds a note of caution 
about buying too swiftly into terms such as the market. He suggests: ‘…there is no such thing 
as ‘the market’ as monolithic entity, and in any case, it does not come equipped with 
supernatural powers of truth production.’ (101). In engaging with market-based interventions, 
we might then need to consider the specific feature of market activity around which such 
interventions are organised. To take two initial examples, although research assessment in 
UK Universities through the Research Excellence Framework (REF) and environmental 
legislation developed in the EU’s Emissions Trading System (ETS) are both critiqued as 
examples of marketization,3 the former is organised around notions of competition and the 
latter around notions of trade and exchange. To make sense of market-based interventions 
into collective concerns like these, we will need to engage with the terms of each intervention 
and the market-like relations around such matters as competition or trade and exchange that 
these terms pre-suppose.  
Going further, if we are to move away as Mirowski suggests from the notion that ‘the market’ 
straightforwardly produces its own truth, we might also need to investigate the means by 
which interventions achieve their effects. Mitchell’s (2002) work is useful here for suggesting 
that market phenomena come ‘into being not by disembedding market relations from a larger 
social ground that previously contained them, but by embedding certain …practices of 
calculation, description and enumeration in new forms of intellectual, calculating, regulatory, 
and governmental practice,’ (118). This suggests we might need to make sense of very 
specific phenomena to understand market-based interventions into collective concerns. In our 
initial examples, we would need to study the rankings and metrics used by interventions like 
the REF to bring about competition or the issuing of allowances to enable trade and exchange 
in the ETS, plus the forms of calculation, regulation and monitoring these interventions 
appear to require to achieve their effects.  
One means to engage with these matters has been provided by Science and Technology 
Studies (STS) work on market devices. Here, the history of provocations produced through 
Actor-Network Theory are drawn on to consider markets as heterogeneous assemblages (see 
for example, Callon, 1998; MacKenzie, Muniesa and Siu, 2007; Callon, Millo and Muniesa, 
2007) through which participants including people, objects, and resources are disentangled 
                                                            
1 For example in public sector purchasing of private sector services: see: 
http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/comp_policy/OFT1314.pdf   
2 For example on resource allocation in the UK National Health Service, see: 
http://www.kingsfund.org.uk/publications/improving-allocation-health-resources-england 
3 For a discussion of the ETS and marketization, see Kama (2014) and for the REF, see Chubb and Watermeyer 
(2016) 
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from pre-existing relations and then qualified and re-entangled into market relations. 
According to the work of Muniesa et al (2007) and Callon and Muniesa (2007), devices play 
a role in disentangling and re-entangling participants in new economic relations by first 
creating spaces of calculation into which participants move. For example, people, goods or 
activities might be arranged in a contract, an accounting spreadsheet, or in a price list. 
Second, a specific distribution of agency would be established to order the participants in the 
new space. In this way, who and what gets to set or negotiate prices, for example, would be 
an important feature of the distribution of agency prompted by the calculative space. Third, 
the rules that underpin calculated exchanges and generate market outputs would be set. This 
is important, these authors suggest, for recognising that market devices are involved in doing 
things. They are not abstract entities, but devices involved in articulating material 
transformations and enacting what it is to be economic. 
For market-based interventions into collective concerns, this might include studying, for 
example, the ETS and its issuance of allowances as a device for entangling manufacturing 
plants and their emissions into a calculative space where emissions are made recordable and 
ordered, distributing agency for who and what can act and producing a system of trade and 
exchange (for some reflection on this, see for example, Callon, 2009; MacKenzie, 2009). In 
this way, market devices involve more than just disentangling and re-entangling, they are also 
key to setting the terms of economic relations such as who and what participates with who 
and what in, for example, setting a price (Callon, 1998; Cochoy, 2010). For collective 
concerns, this would mean studying not only the entangling of participants. It would also 
require study of the ways in which the REF, for example, creates both a calculable space for 
scoring and ranking academic research in the UK and a distribution of agency, establishing 
who and what is scored, and who and what does the scoring in order to create and provide an 
evidential basis for distributing government research funds. The market devices of the ETS 
and REF could thus be considered for the ways they entangle participants in new relations 
and set economic terms for those participants, giving effect to a form of trade and exchange 
in the ETS and a form of competition in the REF. 
This usefully draws our attention to the possibility of treating market-based interventions as 
made up from a broad range of different participants, with a central, co-ordinating role played 
by devices. Yet perhaps we might need to sound a second note of caution. In market-based 
interventions into collective concerns, much is at stake alongside financial or economic 
matters. As Callon suggests: “Political and moral reflection is at the heart of markets and not 
pushed out to their fringes,” (2015: 18). With regard to collective concerns, interventions are 
often said to be required immediately4 and the population targeted by these interventions 
often includes the most vulnerable members of society, for example children5, homeless 
people6 or recently released prisoners7. Furthermore, these market-based interventions are 
part of democratic politics, with advocates supporting their introduction and opponents swift 
                                                            
4 For example, environmental campaigners in the build up to the Paris summit on climate change called for 
effective and immediate interventions, see: http://www.green-alliance.org.uk/resources/Paris%202015-
getting%20a%20global%20agreement%20on%20climate%20change.pdf 
5 See: https://data.gov.uk/sib_knowledge_box/essex-county-council-children-risk-going-care 
6 See: https://data.gov.uk/sib_knowledge_box/greater-london-authority-homeless-people 
7 See: https://data.gov.uk/sib_knowledge_box/new-york-state-reducing-reoffending 
And its apparent failure: http://www.bondbuyer.com/news/regionalnews/ny-city-officials-social-impact-bond-
big-plus-1077971-1.html 
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to point out the apparent problems they introduce. For example, firms are said to fail in 
delivering outsourced contracts8 and services delivered by private sector firms are said to cost 
more than the public sector services they replaced and are worse.9 The terms of the market-
based intervention into a collective concern also anticipate and attempt to establish 
expectations regarding participants’ future role in the intervention. For example, making 
Universities aware of the scoring basis of the REF and the eventual distribution of 
government research funds tied to this scoring, is a way to anticipate and entangle 
participants into a specific form of competition, one which steers the activities of academics 
and University managers (Strathern, 2002). The terms of market-based interventions do not 
just require investigation of their economic or market rationale. These are interventions into 
collective concerns and so the market devices involved need to be understood also in relation 
to matters of urgency, vulnerability, political antagonism and expectation. In short, we need 
to understand the normative effects that market-based interventions anticipate and those they 
produce. Our suggestion will be that the economic terms and the normative terms of 
intervention are inseparable. 
One option for analysing these terms is to build on the suggestion of Mitchell (2002) to 
investigate the regulatory and calculative devices at the centre of market-based interventions. 
We can draw here on work on counting, accounting and accountability which suggests that 
devices of intervention help set in place expectations regarding the production, mobilising, 
prioritising and constraining of resources (Law, 1994; 1996). For Munro (1996; 2001; 2004; 
Author 1 ref) these counting and accounting devices establish a kind of prefigured 
normativity. That is, they help to establish in advance expectations regarding the normative 
terms on which participants will be assessed and the types of responses that will be permitted 
by establishing who and what ought to be responsible and accountable for who and what.10 
Hence forms of calculation in market-based interventions could be considered as much 
accountability devices as they are market devices. In this sense a market-based intervention 
such as the ETS based on a trading scheme might provide one set of terms for intervening in 
a collective concern achieved through a particular accountability device, providing one form 
of prefigured normativity that might stand in contrast to another type of market-based 
intervention such as the REF based on competitive ranking and the distribution of scarce 
resources. Explicating the precise terms and accountability devices through which an 
intervention can be recognised as market-based is thus an important step toward making 
sense of how the consequences of these interventions into collective concerns are brought 
about. Accountability devices, we suggest, by setting in place who and what is responsible 
for who and what, the obligations they hold, to be held to account through what means, are 
important because they give precise form to collective concerns and the commitments that 
need to be discharged for their resolution. 
                                                            
8 For 9 examples, see: http://www.newstatesman.com/uk-politics/2013/08/nine-spectacular-council-outsourcing-
failures 
9 See for example G4S and the delivery of Olympic security: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/supportservices/10070425/Timeline-how-G4Ss-bungled-
Olympics-security-contract-unfolded.html 
10 The accountability device can take some inspiration from other work on audit and new public management 
(see for example, Power, 1999). The distinction here is to also make sense of the terms of economic and 
normative engagements through which the nature of participants in interventions are established and the 
consequences that follow. We can also find other recent work that draws on these STS ideas to explore 
collective concerns (such as Laurent, 2015; Geiger, et al, 2014). The distinct focus that we offer in this paper is 
on the economic and normative terms of accountability devices. 
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Hence, the central question for this paper is: how are accountability devices involved in 
establishing economic and normative terms for market-based interventions into collective 
concerns and with what consequences? To address this question, the paper will explore 
market-based interventions and the terms that are established through accountability devices. 
In order to explore the consequences of these interventions, literature from recent STS work 
on markets will be drawn together with STS research on counting and accountability. Moving 
beyond our initial illustrative examples, we consider two UK interventions in-depth: attempts 
to create an evidence trading market for addressing the collective concern of electronic waste 
and efforts to shape social investment markets through a Social Impact Bond for children at-
risk of going into care. Analysing the two interventions will enable a comparison to be drawn 
between different economic and normative terms and how these work in different ways to 
give effect to market-based interventions. The conclusion will offer a discussion of the 
challenges involved in using market-based interventions to address collective concerns. The 
paper begins with a methodological note. 
 
Methodological note 
The research presented in this paper is part of a larger 5-year project focused on market-based 
interventions and attempts to solve public problems. The larger corpus of data features over 
100 interviews and several periods of ethnographic fieldwork. In this paper, the focus will be 
on 24 interviews on e-waste management and children at-risk of going into care. The 
interviews lasted between 1 and 3 hours and were mostly carried out in interviewees’ place of 
work. The interviews were transcribed and then analysed. For the study of electronic waste, 
interviewees included producers of electronic goods, waste managers, environmental 
organisations and campaigners, and members of the UK government department responsible 
for implementing electronic waste legislation. For the study of children at-risk, interviewees 
included members of the responsible UK government office, investors, advisors and those 
involved in implementing the intervention. Analysis of the interview data was carried out 
using an accumulative coding procedure. This involved reading through the transcripts 
multiple times and coding interview discussions into aggregate topics. Topics on similar 
themes were then further aggregated into accumulative codes. Rather than treat interview 
responses as straightforward factual accounts, distinct views on issues were drawn together 
and analysed. These will form the basis for the following analysis.  
 
Electronic waste11 
Electronic waste (or e-waste) was constituted as an issue worthy of political concern in the 
late 1990s and early 2000s particularly among European Union policy makers. The creation 
of a recognisable e-waste problem involved a number of interlinked actions. These included: 
policy makers responding to concerns raised by environmental campaigners regarding the 
potential environmental damage caused by electronic products at the end of their lifespan 
(STVC, 1999; Guardian, 2002; CEI, 2005; Greenpeace, 2008); categorising e-waste into a 
                                                            
11 The e-waste study is used here as an illustrative case. For a more extensive analysis solely focused on e-waste 
see (Author 1, ref). For more on the broader topic of e-waste and its global, environmental impact, see: Gabrys 
(2011); Kirby and Lora-Wainwright (2015). 
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manageable classification scheme12; and developing regulations to manage e-waste, most 
notably the Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment (WEEE) Directive. These actions 
effectively problematized e-waste (Callon, Lascoumes and Barthe, 2009), making it into an 
issue (Marres 2011; 2012) that could move between locations, be subjected to different 
arguments, but also retain some coherence.  
Producing European-wide legislation ensured that e-waste became a ‘collective’ concern for 
a number of parties: producers and retailers of electronic goods, the governments of EU 
member states and consumers, who would go on to cover the costs of waste management 
through the price of electronic goods they consumed. However, as the legislative response to 
the problem was a Directive rather than a Regulation, it was the responsibility of EU member 
states to produce national interventions that could fulfil the responsibilities established in the 
legislation. The collective concern was thus not experienced in the same way across the EU. 
For example, the WEEE Directive was designed using principles of Extended Producer 
Responsibility (EPR) set out in the EU’s Environment Action Plan. EPR established a 
particular focus for responsibility in e-waste management whereby producers of electronic 
goods would be made responsible for taking back even through an independent firm, 
electronic goods placed on the market at the end of their lifespan. However, it was down to 
the governments of individual member states to figure out the precise terms of EPR including 
who would cover the costs and who would be held to account, through what device, when 
and how, and to what effect.13 These terms would prefigure both an economic and normative 
basis for entangling participants in this intervention.  
The implementation of the UK response to the WEEE Directive was led by the Department 
for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS). In the UK, responsibility for e-waste was placed on 
producers of electronic goods in the following way. Producers were informed that all goods 
placed on the UK market after August 13th, 2005, had to include a WEEE symbol in the form 
of a crossed-out wheelie bin. Producers also had to either set up their own or sign up to 
independent Producer Compliance Schemes that would handle the same weight of e-waste as 
the electronic goods they had placed on the market. For example, if a producer of washing 
machines placed 1000 tonnes of washing machines onto the market, the Producer 
Compliance Scheme they signed up to would have to process 1000 tonnes of e-waste on their 
behalf and the producer would have to cover the immediate cost, although costs could also be 
passed on to consumers through product price. These Producer Compliance Schemes had to 
be able to show evidence that they had handled enough weight of e-waste to cover all their 
members’ obligations. The Producer Compliance Schemes’ income also depended on this 
production of evidence: they would be paid by their members according to the Scheme’s 
ability to produce evidence that they had processed the amount of waste for which their 
members were responsible.  
In this way, BIS and the UK government Environment Agency would distribute 
responsibility for e-waste processing to producers, who would then be held to account 
through Producer Compliance Schemes, the Schemes’ processing of e-waste and their 
                                                            
12 The classification scheme comprised large and small household appliances, IT and telecoms equipment, 
electronic and electrical tools, consumer equipment, lighting, toys, leisure and sports equipment, automated 
dispensers, medical devices and monitoring and control devices. 
13 Many of the interviewees who took part in this research complained of the disparate picture of legislative 
intervention that appeared across EU member states’ responses to the WEEE Directive. 
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production of evidence of e-waste processing. This evidence was thus central in setting in 
place and holding in place a series of obligations for e-waste. These obligations would set the 
economic and normative terms for the intervention, distributing the costs associated with 
environmental responsibility between producers who would need to cover the costs of 
Producer Compliance Schemes, consumers who would cover costs through product price, and 
government who were responsible for infrastructural management costs. Setting the terms for 
this distribution of obligations and costs was central to putting in place a market-based 
intervention into this collective concern. It anticipated an intervention that would introduce 
market-like competition: Producer Compliance Schemes were now expected to compete with 
each other on the basis of cost and quality to attract producers and their waste management 
obligations, bringing into being an effective and efficient waste management scheme.   
This arrangement was made organizationally more complex as much of the e-waste would be 
handled by a Distributor Take Back Scheme. This Scheme would take e-waste from retailers 
when consumers purchasing new electronic goods gave back their old equipment. Used 
goods would be delivered to Designated Collection Facilities that were newly set up as part 
of the UK’s WEEE management initiative. From there used goods would be transferred to 
Approved Authorised Treatment Facilities (AATFs) that required approval from the UK 
Environment Agency. Although producers would be rendered responsible by BIS and the 
Environment Agency through the Producer Compliance Schemes to which they signed up, 
Designated Collection Facilities and AATFs would also be held to account. Producer 
Compliance Schemes would hold these facilities to account by requesting evidence of the 
distribution and processing of waste. The Environment Agency would also hold the Facilities 
to account as part of its system for granting or withholding approvals. Any organization 
deemed non-compliant with the responsibilities set out in the UK e-waste legislation would 
have their approval withheld meaning they no longer got to participate in or derive income 
from e-waste management. In this way, intervening into this collective concern required these 
economic terms around cost and normative terms that distributed responsibility and 
accountability in order for it to be given effect. Its endurance also depended upon a specific, 
numeric, accountability device. 
If such an intervention seems complex, its central numeric was apparently straightforward: 
weight of electronic goods in tonnes. Measuring tonnes of goods placed on the market and 
tonnes of waste processed, preferably recycled, became the key accountability device. 38 
newly established Producer Compliance Schemes would thus work with AATFs and be 
subject to monitoring by BIS and the Environment Agency in an attempt to ensure collection 
of accurate evidence of the weight of waste being managed and to try and ensure that waste 
was recycled as far as possible. Another new organisation, the WEEE Settlement Centre was 
established to receive evidence of weight of waste data from producers and Producer 
Compliance Schemes. This evidence comprised: how much weight of electronic goods 
producers had placed on the UK market, every 3 months, notice that they had signed up for a 
Producer Compliance Scheme, evidence from the Producer Compliance Scheme that it had 
handled enough waste to cover its members’ obligations, and evidence that the producers had 
covered the cost of waste management. The WEEE Settlement Centre would then perform an 
annual settlement based on ensuring the obligations of Producer Compliance Schemes 
matched the evidence of waste processing that the Settlement Centre received.   
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In this way, the UK implementation of the WEEE Directive created a new form of market-
based intervention focused on e-waste. This did not just draw together participants such as 
producers, consumers and the government. Instead, the implementation transformed the role 
existing organisations were expected to play, with for example producers now deemed partly 
responsible for waste. It also created a range of new organisations such as Producer 
Compliance Schemes, AATFs, a Distributor Take Back Scheme, and the WEEE Settlement 
Centre. This intervention could thus be considered through the concept of a market device in 
that it created a new calculative space of e-waste management into which participants moved, 
entangling them in a set of economic terms that established who had agency to act, setting in 
place rules around cost and payment. However, as an intervention into a collective concern, 
this also introduced an accountability device. Weight of waste did not just establish economic 
terms around cost for entangling participants but it also prefigured normative expectations of 
who and what would be responsible for who and what, held to account through what means. 
The centrality to the intervention of an evidential requirement expressed in tonnes of weight 
of waste was made apparent to all parties involved. Scales for weighing vehicles and their 
weight of waste were introduced, evidence notes were produced and began to circulate, 
economic terms around price of weight of waste processing were set and mostly paid, 
responsibilities were agreed, taken on and mostly discharged. 
Yet despite the normative demands of the accountability device central to the UK 
implementation of WEEE legislation, in practice problems around weight of waste evidence 
swiftly emerged. Evidence of weight of waste became central to establishing a trading 
component in the UK e-waste intervention. Evidence trading was designed as a means to 
ensure that Producer Compliance Schemes could make any necessary adjustments required to 
the amount of e-waste they had managed, to cover their members’ obligations. It was noted 
by BIS that the precise amount of waste handling required in a given year would be difficult 
to predict as the exact amount of goods placed on a market in a given year, and hence how 
much waste should be handled, might only be known at the end of the year.  
Buying or selling evidence of e-waste management would enable Producer Compliance 
Schemes to demonstrate to the WEEE Settlement Centre that they had covered just enough 
weight of waste for their members’ obligations. For example, if a Producer Compliance 
Scheme had signed up 10 producers that each placed 1000 tonnes of washing machines onto 
the market, and the Scheme had only processed 9000 tonnes of waste, they would need to buy 
up evidence of 1000 tonnes of waste processing from another Scheme. Or if they had 
processed too much weight of waste, they would need to sell the evidence to another Scheme. 
As a form of adjustment, conceived as a means to tidy up discrepancies between amounts of 
waste that had been and that should have been processed, it was expected that the price of 
evidence would reflect the cost of e-waste processing. In this way, a specific set of economic 
and normative terms were anticipated for weight of waste evidence trading. Although it was 
referred to by participants as evidence trading, BIS anticipated that linking the price of 
evidence to its cost would remove such trading from many of the exigencies of market 
competition and that in any case the trading would be minimal – trading was, after all, 
designed by BIS only as a means to tidy up discrepancies between weight of waste that had 
been processed and ought to have been processed. The WEEE Settlement Centre would 
oversee the evidence trading component of the scheme, establishing a total market size of 
waste that needed to be handled and ensuring that each Producer Compliance Scheme met its 
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members’ obligations by mostly processing waste and, if necessary, trading a small amount 
of evidence of waste processing. The accountability device of weight of waste in tonnes was 
central here to establishing total market size, costs, and who and what was responsible for 
who and what. 
However, as the following interviewee asserts, the e-waste evidence trading scheme 
encountered a problem: 
Interviewee 5 (e-waste manager): 
well, [one] of the very small schemes … over contracted to the tune of – well, one of 
them in particular had an obligation [through its members] of less than 1% but 
contracted 25% of the UK collection sites. Which has caused an evidence deadlock 
really and has kind of threatened the whole system really. And what happened, 
obviously that company saw an opportunity to secure a surplus supply of evidence 
and then because they anticipated that there would be a trading element to the 
evidence they assumed that they would be able to sell that evidence for a premium 
because there would be a fixed level of demand for it later in the year [when the 24% 
of waste evidence they didn’t need, would be required by others].  And what actually 
happened in practice is that because most compliance schemes have themselves 
covered quite well, we ended up with a deadlock between the largest compliance 
scheme and this smaller compliance scheme that had secured all of the supply.  And 
what happened is that that [small] compliance scheme ran out of money because they 
weren’t – basically [the larger scheme] refused to buy any evidence from them. And 
so they encountered cash flow problems which meant that collections actually – I 
believe they stopped in some cases because they weren’t able to pay the collection 
companies and treatment companies. 
 
As Producer Compliance Schemes had competed to sign up members and their weight of 
waste obligations, it turned out that they were not all willing to simply trade evidence at cost 
price. For two Producer Compliance Schemes in particular, the situation became difficult. 
The largest Producer Compliance Scheme in number of members, but also in terms of its 
organisational size as e-waste formed a small part of its portfolio of international operations, 
processed only minimal amounts of e-waste and far below the requirements obligated by its 
members. The large Scheme hoped to buy-up evidence of e-waste processing cheaply, and 
certainly at a lower cost than they would have had to incur to process the waste. The small 
Scheme hoped to amass as much evidence of e-waste processing as possible and sell it at a 
profit to other Schemes in need. Neither Producer Compliance Scheme paid heed to the 
prefigured normativity established by BIS which set out a neatly delineated role for market-
like relations. BIS assumed the market-like aspects of the intervention would end with 
competition between Schemes to sign up producers and then excess evidence of waste would 
be ‘traded’ at cost price and overseen by the Settlement Centre. Instead both Schemes looked 
to extract a profit from the trade of evidence. However, with only one buyer and one seller, 
market trading appeared impossible. The large Scheme refused to pay the small Scheme’s 
price and used its network of other trading practices to subsidise its e-waste division. It 
waited for the smaller Scheme to run into financial trouble having paid out the costs of waste 
processing. The smaller Scheme waited for the larger Scheme to be forced by the WEEE 
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Settlement Centre to buy waste evidence in order that the year’s waste processing could be 
settled and completed. 
This deadlock in evidence trading was followed by the e-waste management system in the 
UK grinding to an unspectacular halt. The WEEE Settlement Centre could achieve no 
settlement, the percentages of waste managed could not be clearly matched to the obligations 
of members of Producer Compliance Schemes and in some cases further collections of e-
waste for processing did not take place due to financial uncertainties regarding the future of 
the e-waste management system. The participants drawn into the intervention more or less 
held together, but for a time little processing of electronic waste took place. The 
transformation of a concern regarding what to do with electronic goods at the end of their 
lifespan, into an issue through the efforts of environmental campaigners, into legislation 
through EU policy makers and their drafting of the WEEE Directive, did not lead to a 
straightforward intervention. The accountability device of weight of waste and the 
intervention’s prefigured normativity of how weight of waste should be processed and by 
whom, how it needed to be evidenced and then how it ought to be minimally traded, did not 
endure as two parties sought to trade outside the terms established by BIS. 
Although we have suggested that this is a market-based intervention that establishes specific 
economic terms for participation in, for example, who pays for what, the accountability 
device is also central to the arrangement. Weight of waste is crucial to establishing 
responsibilities for e-waste management and for assessing that these responsibilities have 
been fulfilled as anticipated. However, in the aftermath of the UK e-waste management 
system grinding to a halt, what we can see is that the terms of intervention are not settled in a 
single moment nor do they necessarily endure. For example, the UK government policy 
impact assessment of the e-waste scheme characterised it as: ‘market failures borne from 
regulatory failures.’14 This same assessment then suggested various distinct accountability 
devices, including for example, a new pricing mechanism for waste handling and 
encouraging Producer Compliance Schemes to work more closely together through new 
partnering arrangements. These proposals in turn swiftly became part of further discussions 
in the e-waste community. One Chief Executive of an e-waste firm agreed with the impact 
assessment, stating: ‘the trading of evidence has to stop.’15 However, at the same time, 
another firm suggested that changes proposed by government, in particular that Producer 
Compliance Schemes would be encouraged to work more closely, would be likely to lead to 
an increase in costs, as system changes would have to be paid for by Producer Compliance 
Schemes.16 Accounts, accountability devices and possible futures were re-opened as these 
discussions focused on partially redefining the collective concern of e-waste and the 
economic and normative terms such a redefinition would require.  
The economic and normative terms of the intervention were inseparable and both sets of 
terms were caught up in this discussion of what had gone wrong and what should happen 
next. The participants were entangled in a calculative space in which agency for negotiating 
and setting such matters as cost and price were anticipated and rules at least in theory 
established. This prefigured a specific normativity of who and what would take on what 
                                                            
14 Available from: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/249743/bis-
13-1181-impact-assessment-waste-electrical-and-electronic-equipment-weee-system.pdf 
15 Available from: http://www.advantagewastebrokers.co.uk/news/evidence-trading-more-than-a-weee-problem 
16 Available from: http://www.letsrecycle.com/news/latest-news/bis-to-review-weee-evidence-trading/ 
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responsibilities, held to account through what means. However, participants sought their own 
rules on price-setting and looked to prefigure their own normative terms around how 
evidence of weight of waste ought to be treated. BIS’s assumption that excess evidence 
would be exchanged at cost price anticipated normative terms that were not upheld in 
practice. Instead market-like relations pervaded the intervention, incorporating both 
competition between Producer Compliance Schemes and evidence trading.  
Yet e-waste is heavily focused on a specific type of market-based intervention that anticipates 
efficiency through competition among newly established Producer Compliance Schemes and 
a minimal amount of trade and cost-price exchange of evidence. Switching attention to a 
distinct market-based intervention focused on investment and return will be useful here for 
providing an alternative basis for considering the economic and normative terms, 
accountability devices and consequences that emerge in trying to resolve the collective 
concern of children at-risk.   
 
Children at-risk of going into care   
Following the financial crisis of 2008, several experiments were carried out as the public 
sector and its costs were effectively problematized (to use again the language of Callon, 
Lascoumes and Barthe, 2009) as one feature of austerity government. While e-waste utilised 
competition as the basis for anticipating an efficient, cost-sensitive solution, these 
experiments sought as far as possible to shift certain costs away from the state. One focus for 
these experiments was on efforts to shape the social investment market (see SITF, 2010; cf. 
Barman, 2015) through Social Impact Bonds.17 Relatively localised and small scale 
experiments with these Bonds have been introduced,18 but with an expansionist agenda, 
providing a demonstrative means to address collective concerns from which others could 
learn. Shaping social investment is noted as a basis for saving money, correcting poor 
incentives, unlocking new funding, promoting evidence-based action, transferring risk away 
from public finances and generating returns (Mulgen, Reader, Aylott and Bo’sher, 2011). For 
investors such as Goldman Sachs, Social Impact Bonds provide a new and distinct means to 
leverage private finance and innovative thinking, whilst also earning returns.19 
Social Impact Bonds have involved creating a distinct kind of market-based intervention. 
Here we will look at a Bond focused on children at-risk. The latter became a particular kind 
of collective concern within government austerity measures. Children at-risk of abuse, 
problems related to alcohol, drugs and in relation to their families had been long-standing 
concerns. But from 2010 onwards they were drawn together by the UK coalition government 
with such matters as homelessness and social care as a category of concern envisaged through 
cost. Children at-risk were perceived as one of a number of intractable costs for government 
that never diminished however much public money was spent. Social Impact Bonds were 
then presented as an alternative means of distributing these costs, a means of creating what 
were termed cashable savings (see below).  
                                                            
17 For more on the social investment market and its movement into Social Impact Bonds, see Warner (2013); 
Dowling and Harvie (2014); Bryan and Rafferty (2014); Mitropoulos and Bryan (2015).   
18 30 have been introduced since 2009: https://data.gov.uk/sib_knowledge_box/ 
19 See: http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/pages/social-impact-bonds.html 
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Social Impact Bonds were expected to operate as a particular kind of market device. The 
Bonds would create a calculative space populated with specific participants. Participants 
would include social investors who would work with service providers often from the third 
sector and national and local government who would act as commissioners of the Bond. 
Unlike e-waste wherein the market device was focused primarily on competition among 
Producer Compliance Schemes with a secondary component of trading of evidence, in Social 
Impact Bonds the focus was on investment and return primarily, with competition as a 
secondary component. Participants would need to agree on the nature of the collective 
concern, a means to address the concern, but also a means to set a cost and develop an 
outcome measure to assess the extent to which the concern had been addressed. Investors 
would then need to cover the costs and would receive a return on their investment according 
to the level of success achieved in addressing the concern, as evidenced by the outcome 
measure. If outcome targets were not achieved, investors would lose all or some of their 
investment. The calculative space of the Bond thus also introduced a distribution of agency 
involving the set-up and implementation of the intervention and a set of rules around costs. 
Hence the economic terms of Bonds would be clear for all participants prior to an 
intervention getting started.  
At the same time, these economic terms were inseparable from a set of normative terms, that 
children at-risk were a worthy concern, that investors ought to take on responsibility and 
financial risk for the intervention, that commissioners ought to oversee the intervention, that 
measurement ought to be carried out by an independent third party and that a service provider 
ought to be given the contract to carry out the intervention. Unlike e-waste where weight of 
waste was the key accountability device for organising who and what was responsible for 
evidence trading and for producing annual settlements, Social Impact Bonds were instead 
focused on outcome measures that would both assess the success of actions carried out – in 
this case, targeting children at-risk – and trigger returns to investors.  
These economic and normative terms may appear high risk for investors – they seem to take 
on all the financial risk and depend upon service providers to meet targets in order to receive 
a return. But the UK government’s Centre for Social Impact Bonds has overseen a variety of 
measures designed to enhance conditions for investors. First, Social Investment Tax Relief 
has been introduced, whereby investors ‘can deduct 30% of their investment from their 
income tax liability.’20 Second, there has only been a loose tie between cashable savings 
envisaged in each Bond and payments to investors. Cashable savings must be projected by 
the commissioner launching each Bond as these savings will pay for the Social Impact Bond. 
For example, reducing the number of children in residential care might be used to project a 
cashable saving such as closing down residential care homes. However, the measure that 
triggers returns to investors has to be something more immediate, such as whether or not 
children at-risk have gone into care, regardless of whether or not this creates a cashable 
saving and then outcome measures and payments to investors should be based on this more 
immediate goal. This more immediate kind of measure has been introduced in order that 
investors do not have to wait for cashable savings to be achieved. Third, although investors in 
order to receive returns on their investment depend upon service providers delivering a 
                                                            
20 Up to £270,000 on investments up to £1m in actions and organisations qualified by HMRC pre-assurance 
schemes. See HMRC guidance here: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/social-investment-tax-relief-
factsheet/social-investment-tax-relief 
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successful intervention, the Centre for Social Impact Bonds suggests that the intervention and 
service delivery firm should be monitored by participants and, if necessary, replaced.21 
Investment and return remain central to Social Impact Bonds, but competition is a significant 
secondary component. Once a Bond is in place, different service providers can compete to 
deliver the intervention and this is anticipated as a market-like incentive to ensure the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the Bonds.  
The Centre for Social Impact Bonds oversees this prefigured normativity of how a collective 
concern will be defined, an outcome measure established, who will be responsible for what, 
how risks and costs will be distributed, and how accountability will be demonstrably 
achieved. The terms of the intervention modify the risks faced by investors through tax relief, 
a loosening of the tie between cashable savings and returns, and the possibility of switching 
between service providers. But this combination of economic and normative terms has been 
subject to interrogation. Concerns have been raised that interventions will look to save money 
through ‘creaming’ by just focusing on the easiest to solve cases, and ‘parking’ by 
abandoning the hardest cases. And further questions have been raised regarding the 
difficulties of attributing change through measurement (Fox and Albertson, 2011) or relying 
on narrow forms of measurement (Lottery Fund Commissioning Better Outcomes report, 
2014), the ‘financialisation or commodification of social services,’ (OECD, 2015: 13) leading 
to an erosion of trust, a stifling of innovation (Oxfam, 2013) and a transformation of the most 
vulnerable into an investment proposition ‘for the profit of those most able to pay,’ (Cooper, 
2014: 36). Social Impact Bonds also appear to be resource intensive in their set up,22 with 
contractual negotiations proving complex, time consuming and unfamiliar to most 
participants (PIRU, 2015).  
In a similar manner to e-waste, then, the economic and normative terms of the intervention do 
not only distribute and measure responsibility for action, they also become a cause for 
concern. The extent of these concerns can be explored by analysing the Social Impact Bond 
for children at-risk in more detail. The Bond was commissioned by Essex County Council, a 
local political authority in the south-east of England. It was the first Social Impact Bond 
commissioned by a local authority. The aim was to produce a demonstrative example that 
worked and would be followed by other local authorities. It involved setting up a special 
purpose vehicle, Children’s Support Services Ltd, as an organisation that would receive 
funding from investors to pay for early interventions in children at-risk of going into care. In 
line with aforementioned issues regarding the difficulties of setting up a Bond (PIRU, 2015), 
putting together an appropriate intervention proved complex and time consuming. From first 
pursuing the idea, through negotiations, to then issuing a contract took around 29 months, 
including setting up the special purpose vehicle and deciding on the service to be delivered, 
how it would be measured and the level of payment to be made as a return on investment.  
The agreed aim of the Social Impact Bond was to deliver a form of therapy that could prevent 
children from being taken away from their families and placed in Essex County Council 
residential care. Such care was costly to the local authority and was also said to lead to 
children experiencing further issues in education, crime and life opportunities. To introduce a 
                                                            
21 Monitoring can take place through a board with representatives from different stakeholders. 
22 See: https://www.biglotteryfund.org.uk/-
/media/Files/Programme%20Documents/Commissioning%20Better%20Outcomes/CBO_ways_to_wellness_rep
ort.pdf 
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specific therapy required an evidence-base to convince all parties that a particular therapy 
showed evidence of its likely success and, as we shall see, the evidence-base was also crucial 
to providing an accountability device. The only approach that the parties agreed upon as 
providing a sufficiently compelling evidence-base was developed in the US and was called 
Multi-Systemic Therapy (MST). MST Inc. could provide training for UK therapists to engage 
with children identified as at-risk of going into care. A UK charity, Action for Children, were 
awarded the Service Provider Agreement to manage the trained therapists in delivering MST 
through two teams of four therapists, a team manager and business administrator, dealing 
with 4 cases at a time on a rolling basis.23  
Putting together and holding together this intervention involving a local authority as 
commissioner, investors, Action for Children as service provider working with MST Inc., and 
the new special purpose vehicle, required the development of a very specific accountability 
device. This involved setting an outcome target: that over 5 years, 380 families should be 
taken through MST in 20 cohorts in order to try and prevent 110 children from going into 
care. This prefigured the normativity of the arrangement by setting out a preferred outcome 
and by establishing a prevention target. This target was then tied to an outcome measure that 
would at least in theory demonstrate a cost saving. The outcome measure that was developed 
involved calculating ‘days of care averted.’ This involved attaching a cost to each day of care 
that a child might experience, monitoring those children who went through MST and did and 
did not enter care, then tracking those children over the lifetime of the Bond. Measuring how 
many children went into care set against the prevention target and calculating days of care 
averted, produced the economic and normative terms for the contractual set up of the Social 
Impact Bond – effectively tying together accountability, responsibility, financial risks and 
returns.  
The lengthy contract negotiation produced the following economic and normative structure. 
£3.1m would be provided by investors, including £825,000 from Bridges Ventures, and 
£825,000 from Big Society Capital. Essex County Council projected a cashable saving of 
£17m in total through a reduction in costs of children going into care, of which they would 
retain £10m and pay-out up to £7m to investors. £120 was attached to each ‘day of care 
averted’ as a front-loaded payment to investors at the moment children entered into MST. 
This figure was achieved by calculating the average cost of care, in the range of £20,000 to 
£180,000 per child per year24 and a distribution of savings that would enable Essex County 
Council to achieve its £10m savings target and pay investors around an 8% to 12% annual 
return on investment. This economic and normative structure established a very specific and 
narrowly defined set of responsibilities: that children at-risk of going into care ought to go 
through MST, this ought to be funded by investors, and that cashable savings ought to be 
distributed between Essex County Council and the investors. In the same way that the e-
waste intervention would be held together by the numeric accountability device of weight of 
waste, this Social Impact Bond would depend upon days of care averted. 
                                                            
23 MST involves in home or school therapy to try and get at the root of violence/substance abuse. It involves 60 
hours of contact over 4 months. In a US intervention on those who committed sex crimes, 89% of participants 
who completed the study had 83% fewer arrests for sex crimes and 70% fewer for other crimes in comparison to 
a control group. See: http://www.mstuk.org/evidence-outcomes and: 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/19170451 
24 Depending on the level of care required 
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Of 60 families that went through the therapy initially, 20% (12) disengaged and in 10% (6) 
children still went into care. The children of the remaining families did not go into care where 
there had been a risk this would happen. It should be noted, then, that despite the range of 
concerns raised regarding Social Impact Bonds, in this instance there were children who were 
not taken from their families and placed in care when this had been expected and the 
investors began to see a return. However, achieving the economic and normative terms of the 
Social Impact Bond was not straightforward.  
For the accountability device to be effective and gain the confidence of the commissioner, 
investors and the service provider, the device and its prefigured normativity of who would be 
responsible and accountable for what, was contractually embedded. However, for those 
involved in implementing the intervention, the contractual commitment to MST turned out to 
be challenging: 
Interviewee 1 (Implementation of Social Impact Bond): 
what we’ve found… is that in using a heavily licenced evidence based intervention 
with a number of restrictions we’ve actually …. found we’re much more constrained 
than we initially thought 
 
MST was noted as the only acceptable therapy by all parties involved in setting up the Social 
Impact Bond because it had a strong evidence-base. The evidence-base of MST became 
central to establishing the accountability device of days of care averted that was used to 
trigger payments to investors. MST and the evidence it gathered on the children given 
therapy was thus crucial to the intervention. With no evidence base, there was no investment-
return structure. However, for those implementing the intervention, contractually agreeing to 
maintain the evidence-base appeared to establish a contractually bound accountability device 
that limited their ability to respond to the range of different circumstances the local authority 
had to manage. 
Interviewee 1 (Implementation of Social Impact Bond) 
What I feel though is and I suppose I can see this from my operational perspective – 
one of the challenges for MST is it actually isn’t an intervention designed for crisis 
edge of care work [if you had an urgent problem] MST can’t deliver that.  
 
Due to the absence of a relevant evidence base for other forms of therapy, due to the 
constraints imposed by MST Inc. designed to maintain the evidence-base, due to the 
contractual tie between this specific agreed-upon evidence-base, the accountability device 
and payments to investors, it seemed to those implementing the intervention that no switching 
between forms of therapy could take place once the Social Impact Bond was set up. The 
contractual terms designed to reassure investors and set in place an investment-return 
structure seemed to prevent the kind of competition between service providers that would 
enable a switch in therapy. 
In a similar manner to e-waste, the intervention held together but also ran into problems. Just 
like e-waste it was efforts to exempt certain parties from the rigours of market-like aspects of 
17 
 
the intervention that was the source of trouble. In e-waste, BIS anticipated evidence trading 
would be at cost price, exempting such trading from market-like conditions where parties 
might seek to set prices, compete over price or use price as a basis for making profit. In this 
Social Impact Bond, a tightly defined contract was developed in order to satisfy investors 
worried about the risks they might face in this scheme if they were not exempted from the 
market-like conditions of investment through which their capital would be placed wholly at 
stake. Investors were exempted from financial risk by the contract that used the evidence base 
of the chosen therapy to fix in place MST as the only option, at the same time fixing in place 
costs for each child and front loading payments to investors from the moment a child entered 
MST regardless of its suitability or outcomes. In line with the preferred path of development 
authorised by the UK government Centre for Social Impact Bonds, the collective concern of 
children at-risk of going into care had been transformed into a cost and then a financial risk 
that could be redistributed from local government to investors. However, the means to 
address this collective concern had also been transformed through the contractual 
commitments to supply a single evidence-based therapy tied to front-loaded payments. The 
single therapy, MST, appeared to limit the local authority’s options for switching. Exempting 
investors from financial risk also prevented competition among service providers. The front 
loaded payments transformed the problem of financial risk faced by investors into a payment 
arrangement in which they might have confidence. Unlike other Social Impact Bonds where 
investors’ capital was entirely at stake, the ‘days of care averted’ accountability device 
enabled payments to investors to begin immediately, with the return calculated from a child’s 
entry into MST rather than the therapy’s long-term consequences or success. In both e-waste 
and the Social Impact Bond, market-based interventions into collective concerns also 
contained market exemptions. Market exemptions seemed to be the focus for trouble. 
One focus for trouble was the economic terms of the Social Impact Bond that set out cashable 
savings for the commissioner that would pay for the intervention and provide returns to 
investors. As the following interviewee suggests, such cashable savings were not very 
apparent in this intervention:  
Interviewee 1 (Implementation of Social Impact Bond): 
Would Essex County Council look at this intervention and say this is saving us 
money? It probably wouldn’t at the moment. It would probably not do that. At the 
moment it would probably say ‘would we buy MST if the SIB [Social Impact Bond] 
was not here?’ which is the key question, is it that important? And the answer is 
probably not. 
 
This relatively damning assessment was tied to issues we have already noted, such as the 
complex and time-consuming set up period for the Bond and its associated costs. Further 
trouble emerged as it became apparent that the therapy had higher costs than initially forecast 
based on the US experience of using MST.25 But for Essex County Council these costs were 
enhanced by a high turnover of staff during the intervention leading to extra recruitment and 
training costs. These troubles increased as Essex faced what a former UK Treasury advisor 
who took part in the research called ‘a double spend’: having to maintain children’s services 
                                                            
25 The evidence from which was used to justify its selection in the UK 
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for cases where MST was not suitable or failed and having to cover the costs of MST through 
front loaded payments to investors.26  
In place of a clear demonstration of how to utilise social investment to address collective 
concerns from which others could learn, came further problems. Anticipated savings turned 
into costs that then needed to be saved from elsewhere in the County Council budget. Even if 
the Council wanted to end these arrangements, the contractually agreed accountability device 
that tied MST and its evidence base to repayments to investors for a fixed time, ensured the 
endurance of this Social Impact Bond.27 In this way, both the economic terms in relation to 
anticipated costs and the expected normative terms of MST providing a suitable basis for 
helping children at-risk, became problematic. The accountability device of days of care 
averted that was crucial to putting in place the intervention in the first place, appeared to limit 
the risks faced by investors and reduce the role played by competition. What was conceived 
as a market-based intervention, utilising the social investment market and competition among 
service providers to shift costs away from local government, ended up an expensive exercise 
in fixed contracting. In the Conclusion, we will turn attention to what these interventions into 
e-waste and children at-risk can tell us about the difficulties of addressing collective concerns 
through markets.   
 
Conclusion 
This study of the difficulties of addressing collective concerns through market-based 
interventions began with a note of caution from Mirowski (2013) to not buy too swiftly into 
the notion that ‘the market’ exists as a singular entity capable of producing its own truth. As a 
result, we took a detour via recent STS work on market devices, to explore in detail the 
economic terms on which two market-based intervention into collective concerns were made. 
Our focus was on electronic waste and children at-risk. However, this produced its own note 
of caution: that when exploring collective concerns, economic terms are inseparable from 
normative terms that anticipate such matters as who and what will take responsibility for who 
and what, held to account by what means. To reflect this cautionary note, we suggested 
moving from discussing market devices and their economic terms alone to also thinking 
about accountability devices and their normative terms. Our exploration of e-waste and 
children at-risk suggests five points for consideration in researching market-based 
interventions into collective concerns. 
First, in exploring market devices utilised in interventions into collective concerns, the 
precise form that the market is expected to take requires consideration. In our study of e-
waste, a form of competition between Producer Compliance Schemes was anticipated as a 
basis for ensuring an efficient and effective intervention, with evidence trading playing a 
secondary role as a means to settle any discrepancies in weight of waste that required 
                                                            
26 Days of care averted could be equivalent to a number of different cashable savings. 1. Reducing the 
immediate food and clothing costs of residential care 2. Reducing the care population enough to reduce staffing 
costs 3. Reducing the long-term costs associated with a predicted transition from problematic (and costly) 
childhood to problematic (and costly) adulthood. Only the 1st cost was calculated.  
27 Further questions raised by interviewees: scale, why the term Bond was used, the appropriate level and type 
of involvement by investors, the effects of turning children into an investment proposition and the costs of 
capital. 
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processing. By contrast, our study of a Social Impact Bond for children at-risk looked at a 
market-based intervention built around an investment-return structure in which competition 
between service providers was expected to play a secondary role. Investment and return was 
designed as a means to re-distribute what had appeared to be the intractable costs for the state 
of dealing with such matters as children at-risk, but also homelessness and social care.28 The 
precise form of market-like relations that each intervention anticipates requires close study as 
the form is consequential. It is too reductive to say that the two interventions are solely 
examples of marketization as if they are the same and anticipate the same methods, problems 
or consequences. To understand the issues involved, the form of market-like relations at the 
centre of intervention must be brought to the fore. 
Second, and following on from this first point, the form of market-like relations anticipated in 
each intervention helps give shape to particular sets of economic terms. In e-waste, economic 
terms focused on weight of waste, cost and payment. These were central to the market-like 
relations anticipated in the intervention with Producer Compliance Schemes competing to 
sign up producers on the basis of the cost and quality of the service they provided. In children 
at-risk, by contrast, the economic terms involved costs of care, amounts to be invested, 
cashable savings and the anticipated returns to be achieved. Again these terms were 
important: re-distributing costs and bringing in an investment-return structure were the 
purpose of the intervention. In order to make sense of the problems experienced in using 
markets to address collective concerns, these economic terms are crucial and must be 
investigated because they establish expectations for how the market-like relations will be 
given shape and, in moments of breakdown, point to what has gone wrong. 
Third, our suggestion has been that the economic terms analytically foregrounded by 
adopting work on market devices with its focus on calculative spaces and rules, are in 
practice inseparable from normative terms of intervention. Collective concerns, we suggest, 
are often fraught with moral questions over who ought to do what, who and what ought to be 
responsible, with interventions often said to be required immediately and with conclusive 
effect. In e-waste, we noted normative terms involving who was responsible for what aspect 
of waste, who should produce evidence of waste, what should happen to that evidence and 
how evidence could be used to assess the viability of the intervention. In children at-risk, 
normative terms included how children at-risk should be treated, what should count as a 
viable target, how evidence of that target and the success of the intervention would be 
amassed and used. Understanding the normative terms of market-based interventions into 
collective concerns is crucial, we suggest, for bringing into focus what is at stake and who 
and what will address the matter at stake. 
Fourth, building on this point, we have suggested that accountability devices can be a useful 
way to augment market devices with a means to make sense of the ways normativity and 
calculation are combined. In both our cases, reasonably complex interventions were oriented 
around relatively straightforward accountability devices: weight of waste in tonnes in e-waste 
and days of care averted in children at-risk. Accountability devices, we argue, are worthy of 
further attention in making sense of market-based intervention into collective concerns as 
they appear crucial to the organisation of such interventions, the distributions of 
                                                            
28 These have also recently been the subject of Social Impact Bonds. 
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responsibility involved, and provide the means through which the intervention and different 
participants might be assessed. 
Fifth, our two examples of e-waste and children at-risk suggest that interventions hold no 
guarantee that they will run as anticipated by all participants. Close study of the potential 
messiness of outcomes is required in order to make sense of what happens to the market-like 
relations anticipated in the design of interventions. In both our examples, pushing market-like 
relations to the fore through specific economic and normative terms also involved introducing 
market exemptions. These were problematic in two different ways. In e-waste, it was 
anticipated by BIS that evidence trading would be exempt from market-like relations and 
evidence exchanged, instead, at cost price. In practice two Producer Compliance Schemes 
sought to extract profit from such trading, resulting in the system for a time grinding to a halt. 
In children at-risk, lengthy contract negotiations produced an arrangement that exempted 
investors from financial risk and as a result exempted the service provider from competition, 
fixing in place MST as the only intervention, fixing in place investors’ costs and, through 
front loaded payments, ensuring investors received swift returns. This seemed problematic as 
the commissioner faced rising costs and uncertainty regarding the broad suitability of the 
therapy being provided, but could not switch. This suggests that exemptions from market-like 
relations in interventions that seek to address collective concerns require further study: in our 
examples, it was the exemptions that prompted further efforts to redefine collective concerns.     
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